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Human rights: has the present economic 
crisis proven Bentham was right?
Maria Clara da Cunha Calheiros de Carvalho
I. The present economic crisis and ideology. Notes from the
Portuguese experience
The present economic crisis has set a scenario, especially in the 
southern countries of Europe, for the unfolding of a social tragedy that 
seems far from ending.
The financial troubles and the intervention of European institu-
tions along with the IMF in countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
or, more recently, Cyprus has led to the implementation of austerity 
measures designed to allegedly stabilize the economy and public bud-
gets, thus regaining the credibility lost with international creditors.
One of the common features of the intervention programs has 
been the adoption of legislative initiatives towards the reduction of the 
welfare state.
Hence, it comes with no surprise that Courts have been asked to 
judge if such regulations/rules are in conformity with the constitutional 
laws of each country. Frequently the issues at stake concern the violation 
of individual rights once regarded as the result of previously accom-
plished social and human development. For the purpose of this paper 
it is particularly relevant that we start by analyzing the arguments that 
have been used by partisans and detractors of austerity measures. For 
brevity’s sake, we will only focus on the Portuguese debate that arose 
from the late Constitutional Court decision declaring that a set of regula-
tions adopted by the Portuguese government violated the constitution. 
First, let us briefly summarize the content of such regulations. 
At the end of 2012, the Portuguese government attained the parliamen-
tary approval of the 2013 budget law containing several articles whose 
conformity to the Portuguese constitution seemed dubious. In fact, the 
DOI: 10.17931/ivr2013_wg128_04
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President of the Republic himself, as well as several deputies of the op-
position, submitted a request for the Constitutional Court to rule on the 
matter.
Following the issue of the court´s decision, the international 
press quoted some Brussels officials, allegedly disappointed with the 
outcome of the procedure, to the point that they “could barely disguise 
their contempt for the black-robed judges” who had just decided “that 
cutting the 14th month’s pay for public sector workers and pensioners 
constituted unfair discrimination”1. One Eurocrat was even quoted to 
have said that the Portuguese constitution was the last socialist constitu-
tion of Europe2.
The Portuguese government, having been asked to apply budget 
cuts worth 5.3. Billion euros, in order to keep the bail-out programme on 
track, had planned to do so by reducing public-sector salaries, pensions 
and benefits. The Constitutional court struck down four out of nine bud-
get cuts before it. The elimination of one extra bonus month paid in the 
summer was found to flout the equitable treatment of public and private 
sector workers, the latter maintaining the right to the extra bonus pay-
ment. Additionally, the court also rejected the cuts in sickness and un-
employment benefits on grounds that minimum payments established 
by law cannot be lowered.
In the aftermath of the Portuguese constitutional court decision, 
public opinion was divided between those supporting the government’s 
point of view, and those applauding the reinstatement of the citizens’ 
constitutional rights under threat.
This debate has moved rapidly towards the ideological field. On 
one side we have seen the use of arguments defending the revision of 
the Constitution in order to downsize the welfare state. Cuts on public 
employment, especially in educational and health areas are in order. On 
the other side, we find criticisms to what has been already defined as an 
ideological attack on social rights in disguise.
On matters of political philosophy, the debate that arises from 
the definition of the State’s social role comes with no surprise. In fact, 
one should acknowledge that “since the eighteenth century [the distinc-
tive political issue] has been whether government should do more or 
1  Euro wobbles, in “The Economist”, 13th April 2013. Available on http://www.economist.
com/news/europe/21576129-portugals-constitutional-court-creates-new-problems-eu-
ro-euro-wobbles. Last access 16 July 2013.
2  Idem, ibidem.
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less.”3
If we could consider to be true that in modern politics the debate 
between more or less government is being replaced by the discussion about 
what sort of activity politics is4, we should admit that the former has 
now regained relevance. This debate has generated prodigious amounts 
of academic discourse that cannot be dealt with here. Nonetheless, for 
the purpose of this paper we are particularly interested in ascertaining 
what implications the reduction of the welfare state will have on peo-
ple’s rights and especially how it will reflect on the theory of rights.
At this point it is necessary to turn our attention towards the 
history of modern human rights as some of the arguments used in the 
above mentioned discussion that currently takes place in Europe seem 
oddly familiar to us, in spite of the fact that today’s politicians are appar-
ently unaware of the pedigree of the ideas they are overseeing.
II. Bentham’s assault on natural rights
The well known “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” 
stands as a landmark for the building of the modern concept of human 
rights. It was the product of France’s national endeavours to summa-
rize, in a single text, the rights of all persons. However, its revolutionary 
proclamation of the existence of a set of inalienable rights that every 
man or woman ought to be acknowledged by did not cause a general 
and immediate applause.
In fact, it generated a choir of criticism instead; one can better under-
stand why when we recall the tragic events that took place in France during the 
historical Terror period.
Among the critics, Jeremy Bentham stands as one of the fiercest. 
Although we can find Bentham’s ideas on natural rights throughout his 
works, his main assault on the topic is contained in a posthumous work 
published first in French, and later in English, under the title of Anarchi-
cal Fallacies5. In this text, the author condemns not only the very idea of 
3  LETWIN, Shirley Robin, The pursuit of certainty, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1965, p. 1.
4  LETWIN, Shirley Robin, op.cit., p. 1.
5  The full title being “Non sense upon stilts or Pandora’s box opened or the French Dec-
laration of Rights prefixed to the Constitution of 1791 laid open and exposed – with a 
comparative sketch of what has been done on the same subject in the Constitution of 
1795 and a sample of citizen Sieyès.
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the existence of natural and imprescriptible rights, but also the listing 
of liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression as such. It is 
here that Bentham writes his famous contention towards the concept of 
natural rights saying it consists of “nonsense upon stilts”.
Jeremy Bentham’s scepticism about natural rights is rooted in 
his particular vision of the world and the law. We agree with Hart’s 
view on the matter when he argues that Bentham’s opinion on human 
rights has to be understood in articulation with his formulation of the 
principles of Utilitarianism. In his work A Fragment on Government, he 
expressed his theory justifying the limits of government by resorting to 
the goal of achieving the “greatest happiness of the greatest number” 
rather than by means of acknowledging individual rights.6 This work 
appeared only a few months after the issuing of the American Declara-
tion of Independence and Bentham reiterated his rejection of the very 
concept of human rights later in another paper published under the title 
of Answer to the Declaration of the American Congress.7
Despite being critical of philosophical conceptions that underlie 
the American and French Declarations, BENTHAM sympathizes with 
the republican and democratic revolutionary spirit that animates the 
Americans and the French. In fact, his ideas have exerted considerable 
influence in these parts, and particularly in France, where he translated 
his works. Moreover, BENTHAM receives the title of citizen of France, 
in the year 17928.
We will therefore briefly review here the various arguments that 
align Jeremy Bentham in his attack on the French Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. We will base our main object of analysis on the BENTHAM 
works titled Anarchical Fallacies, with the occasional mention of ideas 
and positions contained in other works. The thesis we seek to sustain is 
that Bentham’s text currently continues up-to-date, since it is an excel-
lent showcase of a set of objections to human rights that are still bran-
dished by their detractors. Opinions are divided on whether the same 
criticism would remain valid today, given the subsequent Declarations 
of Human Rights which have arisen, notably the Universal Declaration9. 
6  HART, H., The Shell Foundation Lectures, 1978-1979. Utilitarianism and Natural 
Rights, “Tulane Law Review”, 53, ap. 1979, passim.
7  HART, ibidem, p. 664.
8  Cf. GETTEL, Raymond, História das Ideias Políticas, trans. Port., Lisboa: Ed. Inquérito, 
1936, pp. 395-397.
9 Here I take into account the now classic analyses carried out by TWINING and DAL-
GARNO. Cf. The contemporary significance of Bentham’s Anarchical Fallacies, in “Jer-
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We shall not deal with analysing this question, but rather seek to dem-
onstrate that, in theory, many of the criticisms that have continued to be 
addressed today to the natural rights or human rights follow, to some 
extent, the line of thought of BENTHAM and many of the human rights 
theories themselves move within the legalistic pattern he used to anal-
yse and criticize natural rights. It is clear that many of the current critics 
of human rights have the benefit of being able to take into account the 
actual practice of human rights, with special emphasis on that which 
has marked international relations. For that reason alone, there would 
always be room for disagreement. The focus will be the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition of criticism of the Bills of Rights, in particular, with noticeable 
influence of utilitarian philosophy. Later, we will briefly comment on 
these criticisms. 
In the interests of greater clarity of the exposition of ideas, we 
prefer to bring together the main arguments used by the British author 
under three distinct sections, which were given the following designa-
tions: logical objections, political objections, and legal objections. This 
is our arrangement and does not reflect any division the British author 
included in his original text.
1. BENTHAM’s arguments against the Declaration of Human 
Rights
a) Logical objections
In the text of the Anarchical Fallacies, as in many other works, 
the British author clearly expresses the intellectual contempt he feels for 
the “doctrine” of natural rights. This is, in his opinion, the result of a 
series of errors of reasoning that he analytically looks to deconstruct. 
These errors in reasoning are enhanced by the poor quality of the draft-
ing of the text, aspect which we focus here as well, given that it is dif-
ficult to maintain a line between the purely procedural and substantive 
aspects involved in the critical exercise of the British author.10
Bentham divides his analysis of the Declaration on two occa-
emy BENTHAM. Critical Assessments”, London/New York: Routledge, vol. III, 1993; 
DALGARNO, M. T., The contemporary significance of Bentham’s Anarchical Fallacies: 
a reply to William Twining, ibidem.
10  An aspect with which we agree with TWINING, op. cit. P. 713.
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sions: he starts with the analysis of the text itself, and then comments 
the adverse consequences that he envisions can derive from it. So he 
begins by identifying several flaws of the Declaration of Rights, from 
a logical point of view. One aspect relates to the use, criticized in the 
text, of propositions with a high degree of abstraction. In his opinion, 
the more abstract a proposition is, the higher the degree of probability 
of containing a sophism11. This is a flaw in the logical plan that, on the 
contrary, the English House of Commons would be free, thanks to the 
known British aversion to adopt provisions of an abstract nature12.
The wording of the text in itself is the subject of particularly viru-
lent criticism. The author considers that particularly bad, accusing it of 
being vague, imprecise, inaccurate and full of truisms. He even claims 
that it is a perpetual stream of absurdities deriving from a perpetual 
abuse of words.13. Indeed, the ambiguity would start with the very sta-
tus of the Declaration as it appeared separated from the Constitution, 
but preceding it. BENTHAM, as we know, considered that the appropri-
ate place to establish mechanisms for executive control of the legislature 
11  “But the more ample the extent given to any proposition or sorting of propositions, 
the more difficult it is to keep the import of it confined without deviation, within the 
boundaries of truth and reason. […] The more abstract – that is, the more extensive the 
proposition is, the more liable is it to involve a fallacy.” BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy 
Bentham, John Bowring ed., 1843, p. 496.
12  BINOCHE e CLÉRO, op. cit., p. 24, 21. BENTHAM says: “In the British Houses of 
Parliament, more especially in the most efficient house for business, there prevails a 
well-known jealousy of, and a repugnance to, the voting of abstract propositions.” BEN-
THAM, The works of Jeremy Bentham, op. cit., p. 497.
13  The British author considers particularly important the careful choice of words used 
in legislation, otherwise the result could be civil war. However, the expressions that the 
Declaration employs, seem particularly unsuitable and objectionable to him: “The logic 
of it is of a piece with its [the incendiary of the Efesian Temple] morality: - a perpetual 
abuse of words, - words having a variety of meanings, where words with single mean-
ings were equally at hand – the same words used in a variety of meanings in the same 
page, - words used in meanings not their own, where proper words were equally at hand, 
- words and propositions of the most unbounded signification turned loose without any 
of those exceptions or modifications which are so necessary on every occasion to reduce 
their import within the compass, not only of right reason, but even of the design in hand, 
of whatever nature it may be.” BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy BENTHAM, op. cit., 
p. 497. The great inspirer of utilitarian philosophy had, moreover, particular care with 
terminology issues and even created neologisms in English from Greek matrices. Some 
later became integral part of this language: vg. international, utilitarian, codification, 
minimize. GETTEL, op. cit., p. 398.
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was the Constitutional Code14.
The author points out in particular the blatant contradiction 
towards a tendency to affirm the existence of absolute rights and then 
make exceptions and limitations to those with an indefinite nature.15 
That is instantly evident to him in the analysis he performs of Article 1 of 
the Declaration: “All men are born and remain free and equal in rights. 
Social distinctions may be based only on common utility.” BENTHAM 
criticizes the falsity of the statements contained in the first sentence and 
the ambiguity of the second one.
The first sentence is analytically unfolded by the author in four 
propositions: that all men are born free, that all men remain free, that 
all men are equal in rights, and that all men remain equal in rights. The 
author invokes the multiple subjections, as well as the family, social and 
legal ties that all are subject to in society16, as well as the differences in 
wealth and hierarchy existing in society (between master and appren-
tice, for example) to support this accusation of falsehood17.
He then proceeds to review the alleged ambiguity in this phrase 
“social distinctions can only be based on common utility,” stating that a 
contradiction exists with the previous statement of equal rights for all. 
In fact, says he, one does not even understand what these social distinc-
14  TWINING, op. cit., p. 705, 706, whose opinion we follow closely here.
15  Cf. QUAH, The continuing Relevance of Anarchical Fallacies to Modern Rights Dis-
course, in “UCL Jurisprudence Review”, 2002., p. 218.
16  BENTHAM says: “All men are born free? All men remain free? No, not a single man: 
not a single man that ever was, or is, or will be. All men, on the contrary, are born in 
subjection, and the most absolute subjection – the subjection of a helpless child to the 
parents on whom he depends every moment for his existence. In this subjection every 
man is born – in this subjection he continues for years – for a great number of years – 
and the existence of the individual and of the species depends on so doing.” The works 
of Jeremy Bentham, op. cit., p. 498.
17  Cf. BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy Bentham, op. cit., p. 498. Among the many 
differences that the British author lists are those that are created by the differences of 
fortune, hereditary privileges, gender and hierarchical relationships in nature, as are the 
sovereign and subject, master and apprentice, doctor and nurse, among others. In the 
particular case of the relations between husband and wife, BENTHAM leaves no doubt 
as to his thinking about the recognition in this field of equal rights: “Amongst the other 
abuses which the oracle was meant to put an end to, may, for aught I can pretend to say, 
have been the institution of marriage. For what is the subjection of a small and limited 
number of years, in comparison of the subjection of a whole life? Yet without subjection 
and inequality, no such institution can by any possibility take place; for of two contradic-
tory wills, both cannot take effect at the same time.” Ibidem, p. 499.
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tions are, or how to make them compatible with the previously pro-
claimed equality. In his view, if they are distinctions that affect equality, 
they override it; if they are in compliance with equality, one cannot see 
how they can exist as such18.
On the other hand, the British author criticizes the list of natural 
and imprescriptible rights recognized - liberty, property, security and 
resistance to oppression - and that their establishment, without limits, 
makes them incompatible. Thus, pointing out, for example, that private 
property can only be established and be conceived as a limit or restric-
tion on the freedom of others. 19.
All in all, however, it is not these more formal criticisms that con-
stitute the fundamental objection to the theory of natural rights. As we 
will see, thenceforth, from a political point of view, those articulate with 
the deeply damaging consequences that this entails, according to the 
leader of the utilitarians.
b) Political objections
One of the fundamental reasons for the opposition that BEN-
THAM offers to the idea of the imprescriptibility of natural rights is 
political in nature. In his eyes, there is a manifest inconsistency in estab-
lishing natural rights conceived as negative limits for government action 
and, at the same time admitting that that same government is allowed to 
establish exceptions and limitations to those.20 That is to say that its role 
(natural rights) as a desired brake to the arbitrariness of those in power 
was far short of what would necessarily be the intention of those who 
conceived the doctrines of natural rights.
However, if this is still an objection logical-political in nature, 
the truth is that criticism of BENTHAM does not end here. It is no co-
incidence that the text from which we have carried out our analysis has 
been rightly titled “Anarchical Fallacies”. So the question is where the fal-
lacies contained in the Declaration of Human Rights (or more correctly, 
the theory of natural rights that underlies it and that is truly the target 
of BENTHAM’s attack) are likely to lead to anarchy. Or, put differently 
- borrowing the exact words of the author - are a threat to the entire gov-
18  BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy Bentham, op. cit. p. 499.
19  BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy Bentham, op. cit., p. 503.
20  Cf. QUAH, op. cit., p. 218.
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ernment and the stability of society itself21.
It seems to us that there are two main reasons why BENTHAM 
saw therein the existence of a threat. Firstly, the author considered that 
the Declaration was a standing invitation to insurrection as it made it 
almost a duty that the people should resent any violation of their natu-
ral rights22. Let us remember that one of the rights established was the 
resistance to oppression, which BENTHAM interpreted in the broader 
and most radical of terms. It is true that, even though they make no 
reference to the terrible events that characterized the era in France, they 
would not be oblivious to this interpretation made of the Declaration. 
As well remember some of the critics of BENTHAM’s thinking, he lived 
a troubled moment of history, in which the fear of the “mob” was a 
constant concern of the upper classes of England23. Hence perhaps some 
exaggeration in the very radical interpretation which carries out the in-
tentions behind the Declaration and its effects.
 Otherwise we could not understand, for example, the analogy 
used by the English author to illustrate the harmful effect of the Declara-
tion: this could resemble the legendary law that the murder of the prince 
on his throne gave the killer the right to succeed him24. All in all, it is to 
argue with the thesis that either “you always comply or never (comply) 
at all,” accusing the revolutionaries of irreparably weakening the au-
thorities of the present and future, to justify the destruction of order and 
previously existing authorities.
Obviously, Bentham was fully aware that the laws are not al-
ways good and that there would, therefore be cases in which disobedi-
ence would seem justified25. 
21  Also in this sense, HART, H. op. cit., p. 79.
22  That is clear in this passage: “People, behold your rights! If a single article of them be 
violated, insurrection is not your right only, but the most sacred of your duties.” Such 
is the constant language, for such is the professed object of this source and model of 
all laws – this self-consecrated oracle of all nations.” BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy 
BENTHAM, John Bowring ed., 1843, p. 496.
23  Cf. BEDAU, Hugo Adam, Anarchical Fallacies: BENTHAM’s attack on Human Rights, 
in “Human Rights Quarterly”, 22, 2000, p. 268 HART also stresses the influence of these 
events in France and the fears they inspired in regards to the spread of social unrest, as 
a result of “contagion,” to England itself, as a justification for the particularly vehement 
tone of criticism.
24  BINOCHE and CLÉRO, op. cit., p. 20, 21.
25  BENTHAM makes a distinction in this respect, between the “rational” or “anarchic” 
attitude that could be taken against an unjust law: “The rational censor, acknowledging 
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But what disgusted him was the idea that any law could be dis-
obeyed, for no reason, without adequately addressing the consequences 
of this disobedience, also harmful to the peace and public order. Hence 
it is critical to emphasize the word “cannot” that limits the action of the 
legislature, in view of the protection of natural rights26.
The second reason that the introducer of utilitarianism would 
have to identify an “anarchic” threat in the Declaration, has precisely to 
do with the recognition of the inalienable character of natural rights and 
therefore absolutely binding of the government. In his view, the entire 
government would forever be severely shackled in its ability for action.
BENTHAM’s objection in this regard is better understood by 
reading another of his subsequent works27, the Book of Fallacies that aims 
to carry out the analysis of the fallacies to which political discourse was 
particularly exposed. Now while we do not find any reference to anar-
chical fallacies there, there is an explicit statement of the fallacy consisting 
in the recognition of irrevocable laws. BENTHAM vehemently rejects 
the possibility of defence and consecration of these, stating, in a very elo-
quent and meaningful way that this would be worse than the despotism 
of Caligula and Nero.28 However, the fallacy behind the French Declara-
tion was precisely as stated, the one that induced anarchy:
“What then was their object in declaring the existence of impre-
the existence of the law he disapproves, proposes the repeal of it: the anarchist, setting 
up his will and fancy for a law before which all mankind are called upon to bow down at 
the first word – the anarchist, trampling on truth and decency, denies the validity of the 
law in question, - denies the existence of it in the character of a law, and calls upon all 
mankind to rise up in a mass, and resist the execution of it.” BENTHAM, The works of 
Jeremy BENTHAM, op. cit., p. 498.
26  In this sense, HART, op. cit., p.p. 81, 82. Says BENTHAM: “For such is the venom that 
lurks under such words as can and cannot, when set up as a check upon the law”.  The 
works of Jeremy BENTHAM, op. cit., p. 499.
27  Subsequent in writing, not in the publication, of course.
28  BENTHAM states: “Suppose this irrevocable law, whether good or bad at the moment 
of its enactment, is found at some succeeding time to be productive of mischief – un-
compensated mischief – to any amount. Now of this mischief, what possibility has the 
country of being rid? A despotism, though it were that of a Caligula or a Nero, would be 
less intolerable than any such immutable law. By benevolence (for even a tyrant has his 
moments of benevolence), by prudence, in a word, by caprice, the living tyrant might 
be induced to revoke his law, and release the country from its consequences. But the 
dead tyrant! Who shall make him feel? Who shall make him hear?” BENTHAM, BEN-
THAM’s Handbook of Political Fallacies, Harold Atkins Larrabee, ed rev., 1952, p. 56.
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scriptible rights, and without specifying a single one by any such 
mark as it could be known by? This and no other – to excite and 
keep up a spirit of resistance to all laws – a spirit of insurrection 
against all governments – against the governments of all other 
nations instantly, - against the government of their own nation - 
against the government they themselves were pretending to estab-
lish – even that, as soon as their own reign should be at an end.”29
It should not be forgotten that BENTHAM, with the publication 
of his Fragment on Government, introduces the utilitarian philosophy 
that refuses to recognize the existence of natural rights, replacing them 
with a utilitarian principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
Thus, although he did not exactly enunciate a theory of rights, one can 
consider that the concept of collective utility30 will act as a filter for the 
individual rights to be maintained and created. This is summarized in 
the following passage:
What is the language of reason and plain sense upon this same 
subject? That in proportion as it is right or proper, i.e. advanta-
geous to the society in question, that this or that right – a right to 
this or that effect – should be established and maintained, in that 
same proportion it is wrong that it should be abrogated […] there 
is no right, which ought not to be maintained, so there is no right 
which, when the abolition of it is advantageous to society, should 
not be abolished.”31
That is to say that our rights should or should not be recognized 
in accordance with the benefit arising therefrom, in the light of govern-
ment for the social whole, or rather, for the majority32. In fact, we must 
remember that BENTHAM has a pragmatically pessimistic view of hu-
man nature, considering that there are two enemies of public peace: the 
hostile passions and selfish passions. In this context, the role of govern-
ment should be to achieve the necessary sacrifices to social cohesion and 
ensure safety33. However, from his point of view, the French Declaration 
29  BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy BENTHAM, op. cit. p. 501.
30  Cf. BINOCHE and CLÉRO, BENTHAM contre les droits de l’Homme, Paris: PUF; 
2007, p. 2, 3.
31  BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy BENTHAM, op. cit. p. 501.
32  Also in this sense, BEDAU, op. cit., p. 272.
33  Also in this sense, TWINING, op. cit., p. 703.
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emphasized both passions thus threatening social peace34.
Furthermore, the British author does not believe that any exist-
ing government- past, present or future - ever has the ability to perform 
such duties and expectations. There is therefore also a problem here of 
effectiveness that emphasizes the need for its rejection35.
c) Legal objections
For Jeremy Bentham no rights exist other than those that positive 
law provides citizens with, at all times. It must be said that to under-
stand the concept of rights for BENTHAM one must keep in mind his 
Theory of Fictions36. 
According to this, the “right” and “obligation” are two fictitious 
entities, the first of which is a consequence of the second. That is, I can 
only claim to have the right X, when the law imposes a corresponding 
obligation Y. This means that the subject be forced to suffer a penalty 
imposed by law, should he not adopt the behaviour that such imposes 
and demands. The underlying reasoning is this: all rights derive from 
the Law, the Law results from the government, so there are no rights 
beyond the positive rights.37
The same is to say, in his opinion, “there are no rights without law-
no rights contrary to law – no rights anterior to law.”38 The British author 
34  Cf. BINOCHE e CLÉRO, op. cit., p. 22.
35  “A government which should fulfil the expectations here held out, would be a govern-
ment of absolute perfection. The instance of a government fulfilling these expectations, 
never has taken place, nor till men are angels ever can take place.” BENTHAM, The 
works of Jeremy BENTHAM, op. cit., p. 506.
36  BENTHAM maintains that the word “law” is a fictitious entity that is used for pur-
poses of discourse and is indispensable for it. He also states that the law depends on 
the idea of  obligation for its understanding, since the efficient causes of the individual 
rights are two: first, the absence of an obligation imposed upon the holder of the right 
and opposite to the latter (i.e. each has the right to do what he is not obliged to do), and 
secondly, the presence of a correlative obligation on the other person (s) to refrain from 
disrupting the exercise of law.BENTHAM, Teoría de las Ficciones, Spanish trans. Ma-
drid/Barcelona: Marcial Pons, 2005, pp. 165 e ss.
37  In this sense, the analysis and opinion we follow here, offered by TWINING, W., op. 
cit., p. 703.
38  Also in this identical sense, states BENTHAM: “there are no such things as natural 
rights – no such things as rights anterior to the establishment of government – no such 
things as natural rights opposed to, in contradistinction to, legal: that the expression is 
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conceived the Law merely as positive law, namely as a command of a 
particular sovereign. In this sense, and borrowing from another of his 
expressions, the subjective right is the son of the law39. Although Hobbes’s 
philosophy was not alien to his thinking, BENTHAM rejects the idea 
that the existence of a natural law of self-preservation in the “state of 
nature” could be conceived (Hobbes, however, admitted to such). There 
are two reasons for this: first, such a right to exist, would lead to the war 
of all against all (what is every man’s right is no man’s right40); and, second-
ly, there not being fulfilled an essential requirement, in his view, to all 
rights, which was the nexus of correspondence with the corresponding 
obligation. Who was the obliged of this right? BENTHAM denied that 
the corresponding obligation could be identified there and its unequivo-
cal holder41.
Indeed, in his theory of rights, the connection between rights and 
coercively enforceable obligations, due to the threat of a penalty, there-
fore plays a central role42. This is an aspect that is also associated with 
his concern about the effectiveness of rights. To BENTHAM, recognition 
of any system of rules cannot take place without the conditions of its 
existence being met. 
Now the natural and imprescriptible rights which the Declara-
tion spoke of did not seem at all to meet such requirements. In fact, the 
declared rights were so, regardless of acceptance or compliance, thus it 
merely figurative; that when used, in the moment you attempt to give it a literal mean-
ing it leads to error, and to the sort of error that leads to mischief – to the extremity of 
mischief.” BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy BENTHAM, op. cit. p. 500.
39  “Right, the substantial right is the child of law: from real laws come real rights; but 
from imaginary laws, from laws of nature, fancied and invented by poets, rhetoricians, 
and dealers in moral and intellectual poisons, come imaginary rights, a bastard brood of 
monsters, “gorgons and chimaeras dire”. BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy BENTHAM, 
op. cit. p. 523.
40  BENTHAM does not have a contractual view of the origin of government (consider-
ing that the strength of contracts comes from the government and not otherwise) and 
does not endorse a vision of a state of nature in which everyone would be entitled to 
all: “Nature, say some of the interpreters of the pretended law of nature – nature gave to 
each man a right to everything; which is, in effect, but another way of saying – nature 
has given no such right to anybody; for in regard to most rights, it is as true that what is 
every man’s right is no man’s right.” BENTHAM, The works of Jeremy BENTHAM, op. 
cit. p. 502.
41  Here we follow closely the observations of BEDAU, op. cit., p. 271.
42  HART, Essays on Bentham. Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1982, p. 86.
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was impossible to equate them to “real rights”, whose normative force 
came from the mandate of the law, and ensure the forcible compliance 
of the corresponding obligations that their effectiveness depended on. 
Which authority did the rights of man come from? The only justification 
led to theories that the British author rejects: those of natural law43.
In the opinion of HART, which we closely follow, his rejection of 
the “doctrine” of natural law is based on what he calls “the criterionless 
character of alleged natural rights”. This lack of criterion was an expres-
sion of the assumed separation of rights (subjective) and law (objective) 
and would have the terrible consequence of permitting that any political 
whim be confused with a right44.
To some extent, BENTHAM is not insensitive to the idea that 
all men should have some and certain rights, but he believes that the 
defence discourse of the innate natural rights, as a way to claim those 
rights for all (of universal character therefore), is misleading. The author 
says: “But reasons for wishing there were such things as rights are not rights: 
a reason for wishing that a certain right were established is not that right – 
want is not supply, hunger is not bread”.45 One realizes why he employs the 
term “fallacy” to classify the propositions contained in the Declaration, 
as BENTHAM would precisely define this concept in his other work, as 
an argument employed with the intent to deceive (which is moreover, a 
questionable definition)46.
The alternative, that Bentham gives us some insight to, is a theo-
ry of rights built on the principle of utility, which can be understood to 
be alluded to in the passage of the text referred above47.
43  Vd. QUAH, op. cit., p. 216.
44  Cf. HART, Essays…, p. 82.
45  Cf. HART, Essays, pp. 88, 89.
46  Vd. BEDAU, op. cit., p. 265. A fallacy can be something that a speech suffers involun-
tarily.
47  HART rejects that Bentham has somehow stated,  a theory of utilitarian not legal 
rights that utilizes the principle of utility as a criterion for establishing and identifying 
the rights that man should have in addition to the positive. According to his view, the 
British author merely identifies two types of positive rights: the rights of freedom and 
rights to services. The reasons for this choice are, in his view, double in order: first, 
the principle of utility would also not be immune to social variations and nuances, not 
providing a more stable anchor point for the reasons for a rights theory than of the criti-
cized “human nature” and, secondly, because such a theory of not positive rights would 
contend with his characterization of positive rights, in particular with its necessary cor-
respondence to obligations that could be required to be satisfied by fear of suffering a 
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The interpretation that HART makes of the British author’s 
thinking, the acceptance of the existence of moral rights (alongside real 
rights – the positive ones) was compatible with his utilitarian philoso-
phy. Moral rights would emerge from positive morale created by each 
society and therefore from human conduct. Thus, continuing to pursue 
this train of thought, what BENTHAM denied was not that there were 
not only positive rights, but rather that there could be rights universally 
held by all, in a threefold sense: them not being the product of man or 
God, their existence not depending on social convention or recognition; 
nor constituting the reflex of certain features of human nature48.
III. The Anarchical Fallacies and the crisis “discourse”
Let us look go back to our analysis of today’s economic crisis.
The arguments now presented by those who are defending the 
downsizing of the welfare state are, in my point of view, very similar to 
the ones used by Jeremy BENTHAM in his works, and in particular in 
the “Anarchical Fallacies” even if, as I have said before, they do not seem 
at all aware of this similarity. Of course, not all the justifications given to 
us by Jeremy Bentham to offer a rejection of the concept of human rights 
are in place, nor has anyone ever been bold enough to publicly defend 
that human rights are just “nonsense upon stilts”.
However, the fact remains that the suppression or reduction of 
the welfare rights are being defended as necessary sacrifices that gov-
ernment must inflict on part of the population for the benefit of a greater 
good. Ultimately, we are being told that what must guide government 
is nothing but “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”. More-
over, the very existence of imprescriptible and unalienable rights is be-
ing questioned in a “Benthamian” sort of way as something which is 
incompatible with the free exercise of the powers of government.
As one should expect, the same supporters of the welfare state’s 
downsizing are fearful of the ordinary functioning of democratic mecha-
nisms, especially the expected outcome of general elections taking place. 
And again this recalls Bentham’s first negative views on democracy.49 
penalty. Essays…, op. cit., p. 85.
48  Cf. HART, op. cit., pp. 83, 84, 85.
49  He later on changed his opinion and expressed his compatibility with Utilitarianist 
principles, as Hart notices. However, at first he was not convinced by democracy sup-
porters and indeed he seemed very critical of French revolution. Hart sustains this was 
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He changed his opinion later on, but there is a logical connection be-
tween the scepticism on human rights and the advantages of democracy.
 To some extent the present economic crisis has put to a test Ben-
tham’s assertion that “reasons for wishing there were such things as rights 
are not rights: a reason for wishing that a certain right were established is not 
that right – want is not supply, hunger is not bread”. Indeed, the lack of suf-
ficient economic resources has made the public aware of the frailty of 
individual rights. Furthermore, there was continuous public pressure 
on the Portuguese constitutional court in order to convey with the re-
striction of rights. The reiterated statement that the people were living 
in a way “they had no means to afford” conveyed the idea that having 
rights costs money.
 In consequence, the public disbelieve in the protection offered 
by any system of rights has increased. This is particularly so in what 
concerns economic and social rights. The question now is no longer to 
understand how to work towards expanding those rigths, but rather ac-
knowledging that no progress ever made seems to be granted.
the result of fear of anarchy and excess inspired by news on the Terror period events. 
HART, ibidem, p. 666.
